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Abstract: Quantity discounts are frequent both in everyday life and in business.
Take, for example, product pricing, gas and electricity pricing, trans-
portation and postage pricing, telecommunications, cable TV and Inter-
net access pricing. These are all examples of nonlinear pricing, where the
selling rm designs dierentiated products and prices them according to
the rm's marketing strategy. Nonlinear pricing is also a general model
of incomplete information and it has a plenty of applications, such as
regulation, taxation and designing labor contracts.
This Dissertation develops a new learning approach for the nonlinear
pricing problem, where the selling rm has limited information about
the buyers' preferences. The main contributions are i) to show how the
rm can learn what kind of products should be put up for sale, and what
information the rm needs to do this, ii) to introduce a new approach in
modeling incomplete information using optimality conditions, iii) to ana-
lyze mathematically the general pricing problem with many buyer types
and multiple quality dimensions, and iv) to examine the computational
issues of solving the pricing problem.
The learning method is based on selling the product repeatedly. The rm
sets linear taris, from which the buyers select the product they wish to
consume. This reveals the buyers' marginal valuations, which is exactly
the information that is needed to evaluate the optimality conditions.
By evaluating the dierent optimality conditions, the rm learns the
buyers who get the same product at the optimum and the buyers who
are excluded. Dierent learning paths are examined in terms of prot,
learning time and the buyers' preferences.
Keywords: nonlinear pricing, incomplete information, learning, adjustment, mecha-
nism design, computation
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Tiivistelmä: Ostettuun määrään perustuvat alennukset ovat yleisiä sekä arjessa että
liike-elämässä. Hyviä esimerkkejä ovat mm. tuotteiden hinnoittelu (ota
kolme, maksa kaksi), kaukolämmön ja sähkön hinnoittelu, liikenteen ja
kuljetusten hinnoittelu, telekommunikaatio-, kaapelitelevisio- ja Internet
yhteyksien hinnoittelu. Nämä ovat kaikki esimerkkejä epälineaarisesta
hinnoittelusta, missä myyvä yritys suunnittelee valikoiman erilaisia tuot-
teita ja hinnoittelee ne yrityksen markkinointistrategian mukaisesti. Epä-
lineaarisen hinnoittelun matemaattinen malli on lisäksi yksi keskeisimpiä
epätäydellisen informaation malleja, ja sillä on useita sovelluksia, kuten
sääntely, verotus ja työsopimusten suunnittelu.
Tässä väitöskirjassa kehitetään uusi oppimiseen perustuva lähes-
tymistapa epälineaarisen hinnoittelun tehtävässä, jossa yritys ei
tarkalleen tiedä asiakkaiden mieltymyksiä. Työn päätavoitteet ovat
1) näyttää miten yritys voi oppia millaisia tuotteita sen tulisi myydä ja
mitä informaatiota yritys tarvitsee tähän, 2) esitellä uusi epätäydellisen
informaation mallinnustapa käyttäen optimaalisuusehtoja, 3) analysoida
matemaattisesti yleistä hinnoitteluongelmaa, jossa on useita ostajia ja
laatudimensioita, ja lisäksi 4) tutkia hinnoitteluongelman laskennan
kysymyksiä.
Oppimismenetelmä perustuu tuotteiden toistettuun myymiseen. Yritys
asettaa lineaarisia tarieja, joista asiakkaat valitsevat haluamansa tuot-
teen. Asiakkaiden tekemä valinta paljastaa heidän marginaalisen hyö-
dyn, mikä on juuri yrityksen tarvitsema informaatio optimaalisuusehtoja
käytettäessä. Kokeilemalla erilaisia optimaalisuusehtoja, yritys oppii ne
asiakkaat joille myydään samaa tuotetta ja ne asiakkaat joille ei kannata
myydä tuotetta laisinkaan. Työssä tutkitaan erilaisia oppimismenetelmiä
eri kriteerien valossa, kuten oppimisaika, yrityksen voitto ja ostajien miel-
tymykset oppimisaikana.
Avainsanat: hinnoittelu, epätäydellinen informaatio, oppiminen, mekanismin suunnit-
telu, laskenta
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1 Introduction
'I should like to buy an egg, please,' she said timidly. 'How do you sell them?'
Fivepence farthing for one -- Twopence for two,' the Sheep replied.
'Then two are cheaper than one?' Alice said in a surprised tone, taking out her purse.
'Only you MUST eat them both, if you buy two,' said the Sheep.
'Then I'll have ONE, please,' said Alice, as she put the money down on the counter.
For she thought to herself, 'They mightn't be at all nice, you know.'
Through the Looking-Glass, Lewis Carroll (Carroll 1871, Chapter V)
The prices have very important role in society. The rms use pricing in marketing
their products, and the prices aect the rms' production decisions. The prices also
ease the exchange of goods and they carry information about the values of the products
and services. The prices aect both the demand and the supply side of the economy,
and thus the prices are associated with economic eciency. But where do the prices
come from?
There are almost as many mechanisms to trade a product as there are dierent kind
of products. Bargaining processes can be used in selling or buying expensive or unique
items. For example, in 1626 the Dutch colonizer Peter Minuit acquired Manhattan island
from native Americans in exchange for trade goods worth 24 dollars. Modern alterna-
tives for bargaining are dierent kinds of auctions, where the participants compete by
bidding, i.e., oering a price for the product. The auctions are used, e.g., in selling an-
tique, art, collectibles, estate and owers, just to name a few. In electricity auctions, the
bids to buy and the oers to sell determine the trading prices. The long-term contracts
and the derivatives, such as futures and options, can be traded in exchange markets.
For example, Nord Pool founded in 1996 is the world's rst multinational exchange for
trading electric power between Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Electricity is
an example of a commodity that is dicult to store, which is one reason why it has a
special trading mechanism.
The most common pricing mechanisms are, however, posted price mechanisms (El-
maghraby and Keskinocak 2003), where the seller sets the prices and the buyers choose
the product they wish to consume or buy nothing at all. For example, a rm providing
public transportation may set the fares based on the distance of the trip, zones or the
period of time. The prices may be set to maximize the rm's revenue, recover costs,
or if the rm is owned by the government then maximize the social welfare under bud-
get constraints (Wilson 1993). Similar applications are mobile phone subscription and
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broadband Internet access pricing, where the prices may depend on the number of SMS
messages sent, nominal data rate (Mbit/s), location and the technology used. These
are examples of nonlinear pricing, where the seller designs dierentiated products with
suitable prices.
One important factor in pricing is the market structure, i.e., how many buyers and
sellers there are in the market and what is their market power (Mas-Colell et al 1995).
If the market consists of a monopoly and many buyers, then it is said that the monopoly
is a price maker and has high market power whereas the buyers are price takers and
have no market power. On the other hand, if the market allows free entry and there are
many producers, then it is a perfectly competitive market and the rms are price takers.
Between these two extremes there are dierent oligopolies, e.g., the classic Cournot and
Bertrand models, cartel and imperfect competition models, where a small number of
rms control the market.
Another important factor is information asymmetry. If a rm is selling a product to
a group of buyers and is planning the price, then is it reasonable to assume that the rm
knows how much the buyers are willing to pay for the product? The rms rarely have
complete information about the buyers' preferences, but on the other hand that may
not be needed to achieve the optimal pricing. There are many approaches to solve the
problem of incomplete information. The rm may estimate the demand with dierent
methods, i.e., get the probability distribution over the buyers' valuations, or the rm
may learn good prices by selling the product repeatedly and adjusting the prices.
This Dissertation develops a new learning approach for the nonlinear pricing prob-
lem, where the seller has limited information about the buyers' preferences. Mathemat-
ical theory and numerical methods are developed, where the rm uses specic pricing
schemes to reveal information about the buyers' valuations. The acquired information
is then used in adjusting the prices towards the rm's objectives. More explicitly, Pa-
pers [I] and [II] develop the learning approach when so-called single-crossing property
holds. Papers [III] and [IV] analyze the more general nonlinear pricing problem where
the product has multiple characteristics or qualities. These papers also examine the
computational issues of solving the problem numerically. Paper [V] compares the opti-
mal learning path computed with complete information against the dierent methods
that use only limited information. This paper gives a new estimate to the value of in-
formation and a suggestion for a good learning method when the whole learning period
is considered.
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This summary is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the dierent functions of
pricing. Section 3 introduces the basic pricing models. Nonlinear pricing is an applica-
tion of a general model of asymmetric information, which is discussed in Section 4. The
dierent approaches to model incomplete information and learning in pricing problems
are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the contributions of the Dissertation.
Finally, future research directions and conclusions are presented in Section 7.
2 Role of Prices
Before money was invented the trading was based on barter and gift economics. Barter
is based on the coincidence of wants, where goods or services are exchanged without
the medium of exchange, such as money. The idea of gift economics can, however, be
interpreted through social status and reciprocal altruism. You hand out gifts and do
favors, and doing so you expect to gain higher status and get the same treatment back
in similar situations. The role of money was formalized in Babylonia when debt and law
codes were developed. The interest on debt is a compensation in money for breaking
the law of not paying back in time. The money is also a solution to the coincidence of
wants problem, and the prices give a measure of value to the goods and services.
The prices do not necessarily reect the exact value of the good to the seller nor
the buyer. For example, the Russians sold Alaska in 1867 to the United States for
7.2 million dollars. According to Bolkhovitinov (2003), the Russians were expecting 5
million dollars and probably the United States valued the land more than the nal sum
of 7.2 millions. The price, however, reected more the Russian nancial position and
the military state after the Crimean War rather than the value of the land.
In neoclassical economics the prices and the market equilibrium is determined by the
supply and the demand. The prices itself are just transfers that determine the redistri-
bution of income between the parties in the economy. The important role of prices comes
from the indirect eect. The prices inuence the economic eciency by aecting both
the supply and demand side through the rms' production and the consumers' purchase
decisions. From the society's point of view, it is important to design the markets so
that the prices are formed and the parties behave in an ecient way. Mechanism design
theory is a suitable framework for studying this kind of problems, where the emphasis is
on incentives and private information. Mechanism design and its relation to nonlinear
pricing is discussed more in Section 4.
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Besides the ecient utilization of resources, pricing has several other roles in practice
(Wilson 1993). Pricing is one aspect of the four Ps in the marketing mix, which also
includes Product, Promotion and Place. Pricing can be used in cost recovery, rm's
strategy, competition, market penetration and capturing market share, growth, product
placement and positioning (Dobson and Kalish 1988), price skimming, revenue manage-
ment and prot maximization, inventory clearance sales, and signaling the quality of the
product (McConnell 1968), among other things. The price itself may also be the whole
business idea of a rm. For example, a dollar store is a retail store that sells inexpensive
items, usually with a single price for all items in the store. As there are several roles
of prices, there are almost as many pricing models. Some of these are discussed in the
next section.
3 Modeling the Pricing Situation
Pricing is a form of art and economic models will probably never beat a good car sales-
man in making the sales. But leaving psychological and sociological issues aside, the pric-
ing models capture many important principles and practical considerations (Nagle 1984)
including inventory pricing (Karlin and Carr 1962, Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2003),
capacity and peak load pricing (Oren et al 1985), road and congestion pricing (Vickrey
1952), priority pricing, price discrimination (Pigou 1932, Phlips 1988, Armstrong 2006,
Stole 2007, Armstrong 2008), spatial pricing (Hotelling 1929), pricing durable goods,
zone pricing, asset and stock pricing (Black and Scholes 1973, Merton 1973), retail pric-
ing (Lazear 1986) and bundling products (Stigler 1963, Adams and Yellen 1976, Palfrey
1983), again to make the long list short.
Pricing can be modeled on dierent levels of abstraction, including industry, market
and transaction levels. The industry level examines the supplier side price changes and
the customer demand changes. The market level focuses on the competition between
the products on the market, dierentiation and customization issues. Pricing at the
transaction level examines the discounts o the list prices. For example, a supplier may
set dierent discount percentages for a customer on the dierent product lines depending
on the volume of the sales of each line.
The simplicity of the tari may also be an important aspect of pricing. A monthly
at rate may be easier to implement and more convenient than complicated taris based
on multiple factors. The more complicated taris allow, however, more ecient pricing
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where the costs are distributed based on the service usage. For example, in pay-per-
view the customer pays only for the chosen television shows and the residential water
and electricity costs may be divided based on water and electricity meters in housing
cooperatives rather than dividing the costs based on at rate per person or household.
Market equilibrium and market behavior depend strongly on the market structure
(Mas-Colell et al 1995). In perfectly competitive market, the goods are traded at publicly
known prices and the sellers and the buyers act as price takers. According to the
fundamental theorems of welfare economics, the equilibria of competitive markets are
Pareto ecient. The assumptions of competitive market do not, however, hold in real
markets and the allocations may not be ecient, which is called as market failure.
The market failure originates often from externalities, asymmetric information and non-
competition, where the rms may have barriers to enter the market or some rms have
market power. Examples of such are monopoly (Spence 1977b, Mussa and Rosen 1978,
Maskin and Riley 1984) and oligopoly pricing models (Spence 1977a, Oren and Wilson
1983, Ivaldi and Martimort 1993), which include Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models,
collusion and cartels modeled with repeated games (Green and Porter 1984, Abreu et al
1986; 1990) and supply function equilibria (Klemperer and Meyer 1989).
In this Dissertation the main assumptions are that the seller can set the prices and
dierentiate the product, e.g., sell dierent quantities or qualities of the product. When
the tari is not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased, the pricing situation
is called as nonlinear pricing (Wilson 1993). The main focus is to study incomplete
information in a monopoly model, even though the model could be extended to include
competition by making small changes to the model. In the next section, it is discussed
that the mathematical model is a general model of contracting under asymmetric infor-
mation, and thus the results of this Dissertation apply as well to the other applications,
such as taxation and regulation.
4 Models of Asymmetric Information
Information, uncertainty and ignorance are one of the most important aspects of mod-
eling in economics (Stigler 1961, Arrow 1963). The cornerstone of modeling the in-
complete information was laid in 1967 when John C. Harsanyi dened the Bayesian
game (Harsanyi 19671968). The theory of uncertainty spread to the applications of
economics such as the market for lemons (Akerlof 1970), i.e., the market of used cars,
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taxation (Mirrlees 1971), screening (Stiglitz 1975), monopoly pricing (Spence 1977b;
1980, Mussa and Rosen 1978, Harris and Raviv 1981), insurance (Stiglitz 1977), auc-
tions (Myerson 1981, Riley and Samuelson 1981), credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss
1981) and regulation (Baron and Myerson 1982). What is most surprising about these
models is that they all have similar mathematical models. They can all be modeled with
contract theory (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) and principal-agent framework (Ross
1973, Grossman and Hart 1983).
The principal agent models can be divided into two broad categories: adverse se-
lection (Riley 2001, Stiglitz 2002) and moral hazard (Holmstrom 1979; 1982). Moral
hazard is also known as the model of hidden action, where the principal cannot per-
fectly monitor the agent's action. For example, a rm may condition the manager's wage
based on the rm's prot but not on the manager's actual eort. Adverse selection is
also known as the model of hidden information, and it can be modeled with signal-
ing (Spence 1973) and screening games. In job market signaling, a worker signals her
competence to the employer, e.g., by acquiring educational credentials. The employer
assumes a good signal is correlated with greater ability to work and oers a higher wage.
An example of a screening or self-selection application is the nonlinear pricing model.
A monopolistic seller produces a product to a market with two types of buyers: a
high type that values the quality more and is willing to pay more for the product
and a low type with lower valuation for quality. The monopoly designs two products
with dierent qualities so that the prot is maximized and the buyer types choose the
products intended for them, i.e., the high type chooses the high quality bundle and the
low type the low quality bundle. The buyers may choose any bundle they wish or buy
nothing at all, and the rm must take this into account when designing the bundles,
that is, the qualities and their prices. The incomplete information here means that the
monopoly may not give individual oers to the dierent buyer types, i.e., the monopoly
does not distinguish the buyers.
Another example is monopoly regulation (Baron and Myerson 1982). A government
regulates a rm so that it does not behave as a monopoly. The government has, however,
incomplete information about the rm's costs. The government designs a payment
scheme to the rm which is based on the rm's production level so that the social
surplus is maximized. A higher production level means a bigger payment to the rm,
and the rm chooses the production level based on its true costs and the designed
payment scheme.
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The screening model is also an instance of mechanism design (Mas-Colell et al 1995,
Nisan and Ronen 2001, Conitzer and Sandholm 2002, Dash et al 2003), which examines
dierent mechanisms with which desirable outcomes could be achieved. The focus of
mechanism design is on identifying desirable goals, the players' private information,
the players' incentives to act in a desirable way and the implementation of the goals
with a mechanism. The study of mechanism design originates from resource allocation
problems (Hurwicz 1960; 1972; 1973, Hurwicz et al 1975).
5 Pricing under Incomplete Information and Learning
Nonlinear pricing is an application of the general screening model. It is not just one
mathematical model but multiple models that dier slightly depending on whether the
buyer type is modeled with continuous or discrete distribution, and whether the product
has multiple or only one quality dimension. For example, the model of Spence (1980) is
a discrete type, multidimensional model where the dimension is interpreted as quantity,
whereas the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) is a continuous type model with a product
of single quality. The multidimensional models are examined in Wilson (1991; 1993),
Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Chone (1998), Armstrong (1999), Armstrong and Rochet
(1999), Armstrong and Vickers (2000), Rochet and Stole (2003), Nahata et al (2004),
Basov (2005); see Räsänen et al (1997) for an application in electricity markets.
The mathematical model has many interpretations. The model can be interpreted
as the seller's uncertainty about the buyer's preferences. The probability distribution
describes the seller's belief over the possible buyer types. The model can also be inter-
preted as self-selection model where there is no incomplete information but a pricing
rule that enforces public prices. The seller designs a public tari, and the buyers self-
select the bundle they wish to consume from the tari. The distribution now describes
the fractions of dierent buyer types in the population. When the pricing situation is
examined as a single decision problem, the interpretation does not play a big role, but
it does when the pricing situation is repeated. It is a dierent situation if there is a
population of buyers rather than one buyer whose valuation is unknown.
When the seller has limited information and the pricing situation is repeated, the
question arises whether the seller can learn the optimal pricing or not. And if the
seller can, then what is the best way to learn it under dierent assumptions. There are
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many approaches to model learning (Fudenberg and Levine 1999) and incomplete infor-
mation. These include Bayesian techniques (Keller and Rady 1999), auctions (Myerson
1981), multiagent learning (Sandholm 2007), reinforcement and Q-learning (Tesauro and
Kephart 2002), dierent heuristic methods such as hill climbing methods (Brooks et al
2002), active and passive learning (Balvers and Cosimano 1990, Braden and Oren 1994,
Bischi et al 2008), tatonnement and Cournot adjustment (Kitti 2010), dynamic program-
ming (Bertsimas and Perakis 2006), dynamic pricing (Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2003,
Garcia et al 2005), stochastic programming and robust optimization (Adida and Perakis
2006) and dierent nonparametric methods (Carlier 2002).
When learning is modeled it is important to dene what the players know, how they
choose the strategies, how they gain more information and what is the interpretation
(Camerer 2003). The most simple models that do not require much sophistication
from the players are evolutionary, imitation and reinforcement approaches. In more
sophisticated rule and belief-based models the players update their beliefs about what
others will do and choose the strategies based on these beliefs. The sophistication allows
the players to experiment actively and produce information about the other players. In
pricing the tradeo in experimentation is between the gain of information and higher
prots in the future against the lower prot now.
In this Dissertation it is assumed that a monopolistic rm sells a product to a large
population of buyers with dierent valuations. The rm does not know exactly the
buyers' preferences but segments the buyers with similar preferences into groups. For
simplicity, it is assumed that the rm knows the number and the sizes of the groups, i.e.,
the number of buyers in a group, but does not know the utility functions that represent
each group. The rm designs pricing schedules that produce information about the
utility functions so that the rm can learn how to sell the product more protably. The
learning is based on the assumption of buyers' myopicity. A myopic behavior means that
the buyers choose the bundles from the pricing schedule by maximizing their utilities.
The learning approach is nonparametric in the sense that the rm needs not assume
any probability distribution over the utility functions nor assume any specic shape of
utility functions. The good thing about this is that it allows generalization and avoids
making wrong assumptions when the utility functions are unknown. On the contrary,
if the rm knows the shape of utility functions, then it should be taken into account in
the method and it may speed up the learning process. The learning approach can also
be seen as gradient or reinforcement learning, where the rm estimates the direction of
prot increase and adjusts the pricing schedule towards this direction.
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6 Contributions
Papers [I] and [II] show how the rm can learn the optimal solution in a pricing problem
where the product has a single quality dimension. Paper [I] studies a pricing problem
with two buyer types and suggests an adjustment approach using discrete steps. It is
reasonable to assume only two types in some applications, e.g., in pricing phonecalls
where there are two natural customer segments of business and personal use (Jain et al
1999). Paper [II] is an extension to more than two customer segments.
Papers [III] and [IV] examine the multidimensional problem where the buyers' utility
functions need not be ordered. Paper [III] analyzes the problem mathematically and
examines what modications need to be done in the learning method. Paper [IV] gives an
interpretation to the Lagrange multipliers of the problem and studies the computational
side of the problem.
Paper [V] examines continuous learning paths instead of using discrete steps. The
methods that use limited information are compared with each other and the optimal
path which is computed with complete information. The main idea of the paper is to
nd good methods under dierent criteria when the whole learning period is considered.
The contributions of each paper are now explained more thoroughly.
6.1 Adjustment in a Unidimensional Problem
The adjustment approach was introduced in Ehtamo et al (2002) and Kitti and Ehtamo
(2009), where it is shown that the equilibrium arises as a long run outcome of an
adjustment process. In Ehtamo et al (2002), the players who grope their way towards
the Pareto optimal outcome have only one type. They also postulate an extra player, a
mediator, who could help the principal and the agent in the negotiations. The mediator
could nd the equlibrium by using linear contracts without knowing the parties' utility
functions.
Paper [I] takes another view on the adjustment approach. It is assumed that the
monopolistic seller can set the prices, and there are two types of buyers. The adjustment
is now more complicated as the equilibrium is not a single negotiable variable and
its price but two quantity-price bundles, that is, one for each buyer type. The aim
of the adjustment is also dierent. The seller adjusts the price schedule towards the
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prot-maximizing solution, which may not be Pareto optimal. The method to reveal
information about the buyers' preferences is similar to Ehtamo et al (2002). When the
seller oers the buyers a linear tari, the buyer's choice of utility-maximizing amount
will reveal the slope of the utility function at that chosen quantity. With this information
the seller may adjust the bundles towards the optimal solution.
Paper [I] develops the optimality conditions for the pricing problem under standard
assumptions made in the literature, and it shows how these conditions can be used in
adjusting the price schedule under limited information. The assumptions eliminate some
pathological pricing situations, and they make it possible to learn the optimal bundles
using only local information about the buyers' preferences. It is examined in Paper [III]
that the relaxation of the assumptions adds little complexity to solving the problem
with only two buyer types. Paper [I] assumes the standard single-crossing property,
which restricts the shape of buyer types' utility functions. This combined with the
other assumptions mean that it is optimal to sell positive amounts to both buyers, the
solution is never Pareto optimal and certain constraints are active in the optimum. It
is discussed in Paper [III] that the optimal bundles may actually be ecient and the
utility functions need not be peculiar for this to happen. When the more general utility
functions are allowed, also the adjustment method needs to be modied a little from
what is presented in Paper [I].
The optimality conditions in Paper [I] give the equations that determine the optimal
bundles. There are two equations for the optimal prices. The rst equation means that
the buyer type who values the product less, the low type, is indierent between having
the bundle or not, i.e., the price equals the valuation. The second equation means that
the buyer type who values the product more, the high type, is indierent between the
high and low bundles, i.e., the price dierence equals the valuation dierence of the
bundles. There are also two equations for the optimal quantities. The equation for
high type means that the marginal valuation equals the marginal cost at the optimal
quantity. The equation for low type means that the marginal prot of the low bundle
equals the dierence of marginal valuations at the optimal quantity. So, from the seller's
point of view the optimal quantities depend on the marginal valuations, and the optimal
prices depend on the valuations itself. Furthermore, the optimal prices depend on the
optimal quantities and not vice versa, and thus the optimal quantities should be solved
rst. Also, the optimal price of high bundle depends on the optimal price of the low
bundle. This means that there is a natural order in which to solve the optimal bundles.
To solve the optimal quantities, the seller needs to know the buyers' marginal val-
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uations. For the high bundle, the marginal valuation should equal the marginal cost.
The seller can learn this quantity by oering linear taris as was initially suggested in
Ehtamo et al (2002). The seller sets a slope for the tari and adjusts it so that the
optimality condition is met. The seller learns the marginal valuations since the buyers
choose prot-maximizing quantities from the linear tari. There is, however, a better
way to nd the optimal quantity in one iteration. The seller can use its cost function
plus constant as a nonlinear tari, and the buyers now choose automatically quantities
so that the marginal valuations equal the marginal costs.
Learning the optimal quantity for the low bundle is a bit more complicated and it
is the main idea of Paper [I]. Since the optimality condition involves both the marginal
valuations of low and high types, the equation consists of two unknown terms for the
seller. The seller could oer multiple linear taris and adjust the slopes so that both
types choose the same quantity. This way the seller could evaluate the optimality
condition at a certain quantity, and learn whether this quantity is lower or higher than
the optimal amount. But again there is another way to evaluate the optimality condition
in just two iterations. The idea is that the seller may rst solve the low type's marginal
valuation at some quantity and then solve what the high type's slope should be in order
to satisfy the optimality condition. The seller then sets a tari with this computed slope
and tests whether it is the real marginal valuation for the high type or not. This way
the seller learns whether the quantity is lower or higher than the optimal amount, and
it gives the direction for adjustment.
Once the optimal quantities are found, the nal step is to nd the optimal prices.
The prices can be learned by raising and lowering the prices and giving the buyers take
it or leave it oers. The seller learns that the price is too high when the buyer refuses
to buy its bundle. The rm can now nd the optimal price with a simple method.
Paper [II] is a generalization to more than two buyer types. It analyzes the problem
mathematically, examines what happens when there are many buyer types and shows
how the learning method should be modied. The most fundamental change with many
buyer types is that some types may get the same bundle at the optimum and this is
called as bunching. It may also be optimal that the rm does not sell the product to all
buyer types, which is called as exclusion. This means that dierent types are bunched
and excluded when the buyers have dierent utility functions. From the learning point
of view the rm does neither know the active constraints at the optimum nor the correct
optimality conditions to be solved. But it is shown that when the single-crossing and
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appropriate convexity assumptions hold the seller can learn the optimal structure, i.e.,
who to bunch and who to exclude.
The rst observation is that the optimality conditions consist of a marginal valuation
of the lowest type in the bunch and a marginal valuation of the type above the highest
type in the bunch. So again, the conditions consist of two unknown terms for the seller.
Proposition 1 in Paper [II] shows a way to learn which types should be bunched and
excluded. This adds another step in the learning method. The seller rst learns who
to bunch while the product's quality is adjusted. This is done by evaluating multiple
optimality conditions. When the optimal bunch is known, the learning method is similar
to the method in Paper [I] as only one condition needs to be evaluated. Paper [II] also
oers some improvements to the learning method by introducing intervals and areas of
uncertainty. It is also suggested that the buyers' utility functions could be approximated
and estimated collectively rather than one by one, which could improve the learning
method when there are many buyer types.
6.2 Multiple Dimensions and General Utility Functions
All theories have limiting assumptions. In nonlinear pricing, one of these assumptions is
the single-crossing property and the related Spence-Mirrlees condition (Edlin and Shan-
non 1998). This condition restricts the shape of buyers' utility functions and assumes
that the valuations can be ordered. The single-crossing condition was introduced in
the multidimensional problem by McAfee and McMillan (1988). They showed that the
multidimensional problem can be reduced to the single dimensional problem and thus
it can be solved the same way provided that the single-crossing condition is satised.
It has been later examined what happens when the assumption is not valid anymore
(Wilson 1993; 1995, Araujo and Moreira 1999, Nahata et al 2001; 2003), i.e., the buyers'
utility functions can be of general shape and the valuations need not be ordered the
same way in all dimensions.
From the mathematical point of view, the relaxation of the single-crossing condition
is dramatic as the assumption simplies the problem considerably. Under the assump-
tion, only small number of constraints, i.e., the local downward constraints (Maskin
and Riley 1984), can be active at the optimum. This means that the structure of the
solution is of chain type (Nahata et al 2004). From the economic point of view, the
assumption aects the eciency of the solution (Andersson 2005, Nahata et al 2006,
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Andersson 2008). Under the assumption, only the highest buyer type gets the ecient
bundle, whereas the whole solution may be ecient when the valuations are appropriate,
for example, when the buyers are not interested in each others' bundles.
From the learning point of view, the assumption has signicance for two reasons.
Firstly, the seller can learn the active constraints easily, as was shown in Paper [II],
since there are not so many combinations as there can be without the single-crossing
assumption. Secondly, the optimality conditions consist of no more than two types'
marginal valuations, whereas the conditions may have many marginal valuations when
the assumption is violated. This means that the optimality conditions are more com-
plicated to solve under limited information.
Papers [III] and [IV] generalize the pricing problem to multiple dimensions and gen-
eral shapes of utility functions. This means that the seller designs for each buyer type a
bundle consisting of a price and multiple qualities that dene the product. Paper [III]
develops an important notion of directed graph (digraph) presentation which helps in
representing and analyzing the solution; see Nahata et al (2004) for related digraphs
in more general problem with type-splitting and general cost structure. The digraph
basically consists of the buyer types and the active constraints between the types. The
Lagrange multipliers can be interpreted as ows between the buyer types and the multi-
pliers together form a ow network. The Lagrange multiplier interpretation is discussed
more thoroughly in Paper [IV].
The digraph presentation makes it easy to analyze the solution. First, the digraph
represents the relation of the bundles, i.e., which bundles are distorted in order to gain
better prots from the other bundles and how the prices are related to each other. It is
also possible to do sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in the buyer's preferences.
With small changes it may happen that the active constraints do not change, and with
bigger changes it is possible to guess the new active constraints and the corresponding
digraph. Second, the bundles position in the digraph is associated with the protability
and eciency of the bundle. The digraph gives a partial order to the bundles in terms
of prot. The most protable bundles are at the end of the digraph, and these must
also be the ecient bundles in terms of quality.
The structure of the digraph can be used in solving the optimization problem more
eciently, which is explained in Paper [IV]. If the digraph consists of parts that do not
have active constraints between them, then these parts can be solved in parallel, i.e.,
independent of each other. Also, some other features of a specic pricing problem can
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be used in enhancing the optimization. For example, the number of constraints can be
reduced dramatically when the buyers' utility functions are known approximately and
the Lagrange multipliers can be deduced when they have distinctive values.
The most important part of solving the pricing problem is nding the active con-
straints as it creates considerable complexity of solving the problem. When the active
constraints and the Lagrange multipliers are known, the optimization problem reduces
to solving a set of independent nonlinear equations. From the seller's point of view
these equations consist of the buyers' marginal valuations depending on the active con-
straints. These equations can basically be solved in the same way as in Papers [I] and
[II] under limited information. The problem is to know the active constraints and the
fact that there are enormous number of combinations when the utility functions can
be of a general shape. It is calculated in Paper [III] that there are about 100 dierent
digraphs when there are only three buyer types, and with around 15 types the number
of digraphs is over 10
100
. This means that it may be dicult or nearly impossible to
guess the correct active constraints when there are many buyer types.
The roles and interpretations of Lagrange multipliers are examined in Paper [IV].
The multipliers can be interpreted as ows between the buyer types. The optimality
conditions represent a general conservation law. This law means that in each node of the
digraph the incoming ows plus the weight of the corresponding buyer type must equal
the outgoing ows. The multipliers also have the standard sensitivity interpretation
by approximating how much the optimal prot would change if the constraints were
changed a little. Paper [IV] also shows how the non-uniqueness of the multipliers is
related to the stability of the solution. If some buyer types are bunched together, then
the range of possible multipliers is connected to how much the buyers' preferences need
to change in order to break the bunch and change the digraph.
6.3 Optimization over the Learning Period
Papers [I] and [II] study how the seller can learn the optimal solution under limited
information. These papers do not, however, examine how well the optimum is reached,
i.e., what happens during the learning period. Paper [V] denes dierent learning paths
and analyzes these paths with respect to suitable criteria. The learning paths are dened
by heuristics that use only limited information. The paths are compared to the optimal
learning path in terms of discounted prot, which is computed with complete information
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and dynamic programming. Besides the prot, the other criteria used in evaluation are
the learning time and the buyers' utilities over the learning period.
The learning dynamics of Paper [V] are the gradient and dierent modied methods.
The methods assume that the seller knows the buyers' marginal valuations locally around
the currently sold bundles. The dierence to Papers [I] and [II] is that the adjustment
is done continuously rather than taking some discrete steps. This means that the step
lengths need not be dened in the methods of Paper [V], which makes it easier to do
the comparison.
The gradient method uses the steepest ascent direction to the seller's prot. The
numerical experiments show that the gradient method improves the prot fast initially
but it takes long time to learn the optimal solution. Paper [V] denes a class of learning
methods, which use directions that both improve the seller's prot and are acceptable
for the buyers as well. Two methods are examined from this class of methods: price
raise method and constant direction method. The former is similar to the gradient
method, except when there are no active constraints for a bundle. Only the price is
raised when this happens. The numerical results show that the price raise method nds
the optimum faster than the gradient method and gives better prots in the end of the
learning period. The idea of the constant direction method is to update the quality of
a bundle towards the optimal value. This method nds the optimal bundles faster and
gives better utilities to the buyers than the other two methods. The method is, however,
a bit problematic as it is assumed that the optimal structure of the solution is known.
The optimal learning path is computed using complete information and dynamic
programming (Bertsekas 2005). The quality-price space is discretized and the optimal
path is solved in a regular grid. The idea of the method is to dene a value, or a
prot-to-go function, in each point of the grid. With these values the optimal path can
be solved by determining locally where the next step should be taken. The prot-to-go
function is solved by repeating the value iteration, which takes into account the future
prots and discounting. The numerical results show that the optimal path may be far
o from the learning dynamics due to jumps, where some buyer types switch from one
bundle to another. The jumps are dicult to include in the learning dynamics since
some bundles are updated even though none of the buyers buys them. If the buyers do
not buy the bundle, the seller does not get information about the preferences around the
bundle. But if the optimal path does not involve jumps, it can be approximated with
appropriate learning methods. When the discount factor is high, the gradient method
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is close to the optimal path. On the other hand, if the seller wants to minimize the
learning time, the constant direction type of methods can be used.
7 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
`Living backwards!' Alice repeated in great astonishment. `I never heard of such a thing!'
`-- but there's one great advantage in it, that one's memory works both ways.'
`I'm sure mine only works one way,' Alice remarked.
`I can't remember things before they happen.'
`It's a poor sort of memory that only works backwards,' the Queen remarked.
`What sort of things do you remember best?' Alice ventured to ask.
`Oh, things that happened the week after next,' the Queen replied in a careless tone.
Through the Looking-Glass, Lewis Carroll (Carroll 1871, Chapter V)
This Dissertation develops a new learning approach for the nonlinear pricing problem.
The main contributions are i) to show how the rm can learn how many products and
what kind of products should be put up for sale when the demand is uncertain, and
what information the rm needs to do this, ii) to analyze mathematically the general
pricing problem with multiple quality dimensions and more general utility functions, and
iii) to examine the computational questions of solving the pricing problem numerically.
The learning method is based on the use of linear taris and the revelation of the
buyers' marginal valuations. These valuations allow the rm to evaluate the optimality
conditions and adjust the pricing towards greater prots.
The developed methods help rms in marketing questions such as pricing, product
placement and dierentiation. The approach, however, leaves aside important practical
issues like advertising, competition, sociology and psychology (Wertenbroch and Skiera
2002, Liechty et al 2005, Voelckner 2006). Some of these aspects could be included in
the model with small modications, like the brands and competition (Bonatti 2010).
The methods extend to a variety of applications as the pricing model is an instance
of a general model of incomplete information. The pricing model is also a Stackelberg
game and these games oer possible extensions and applications to the methods. The
requirement for the learning approach is that the situation is repeated. This allows
the players to learn about each other's preferences and make the adjustment to their
actions.
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One interesting future research direction is applying the methods to real-life prob-
lems. This means modifying the model and matching the available data to the model.
One important aspect of the problem is data collection and data mining (Chen et al
1996, Kantardzic 2002), i.e., the extraction of patterns from possibly huge data sets.
Take, for example, Google who collects enormous data sets from visitors. This data can
be used in nding current trends, customer segmentation, or creating personalized ads
based on Internet usage and spatial information.
Another research direction is to study further the computational questions that were
raised in Papers [III] and [IV]. What are good algorithms and heuristics to solve the
multidimensional pricing problem when all customer data is available and what about
when the rm has limited information? The model could also be modied to include,
e.g., inventory, capacity and integer constraints. It may, for example, be that some
quality dimensions in the pricing problem have only few possible quality levels, and this
could be modeled with mixed integer nonlinear programming framework. Moreover,
it would be interesting to study real-time and nonlinear pricing as an alternative to
combinatorial auctions (Sandholm 2002, de Vries and Vohra 2003).
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